非审计费用，信息披露和审计质量【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
外文题目 Non-audit fees, disclosure and audit quality
外文出处 Bristol University, England The European Accounting Review 1999, 8:2, 239–252
外文作者 Clive S. Lennox
原文:
Non-audit fees, disclosure and audit quality
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of non-audit services on audit quality. Following The announcement of the requirement to disclose non-audit fees, approximately one-third of UK panies disclosed before the requirement became panies were more likely to disclose early, auditor size, directors’ shareholdings and non-audit fees were not signicantly correlated with early disclosure. These results cast doubt on the view that voluntary disclosure of non-audit fees was used to signal audit quality. The evidence also indicates a positive weakly significant relationship between disclosed non-audit fees and audit qualications. This suggests that when non-audit fees are disclosed, the provision of non-audit services does not reduce audit quality.
INTRODUCTION
DeAngelo (1981a) has argued that audit quality depends on the joint probability of an auditor discovering and disclosing a problem in an accounting system. Given that a problem has been discovered, the probability that an auditor discloses the problem depends on the degree of independence. The theoretical relationship between non-audit services and audit quality is ambiguous. On the one hand, non-audit services may increase auditors’ client knowledge and therefore increase the probability that problems are discovered. Therefore, for a given level of independence, non-audit
services may increase audit quality. On the other hand, non-audit services may increase or reduce auditor independence. If non-audit services provide auditors with client-specific rents, companies may be able to obtain more favourable reports by threatening to switch auditor – in this case, non-audit services may reduce independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; Antle, 1984; Simunic,1984; Acemoglu and Gietzman