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绩效评估和有效排序【外文翻译】.doc
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本科毕业设计(论文)外文翻译PerformanceEvaluationsandEfficientSortingMuchoftheproductioninfirmstakesplaceovertime.Thispaperseekstounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationonlongprojects.Inparticular,themodelexploresthesortingeffectsofperformanceevaluations.Conductinganinterimperformanceevaluationincreasesefficiencybyprovidingtheoptiontoendprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Themainresult:Itisefficienttoallocatemoreresourcestowardstheendofaproject.Thisresultholdsunderavarietyofscenarios:whentheworkerhasunknownability,whentheoutsideoptionsvarywithoutput,andevenunderanagencyframeworkwitharisk-averseagent.Theproductionofgoodsandservicestakestime.Ittakestimetobuildcars,writesoftware,developdrugs,formulatestrategy,marketproducts,auditclients,panies.Infact,anizetheirproductionintheformofprojectsthatrunforweeks,months,orevenyearsatatimebeforethefirmcansellthefinishedproductinamarket.Forexample,softwaredevelopmentrunsthroughdesign,implementation,andtestingstagesbeforefinalrelease.Thispaperexaminestheproblemofperformanceevaluationbeforeaprojectisfinished.Themainideaisthatperformanceevaluationsgenerateefficientsorting.Theyprovidethefirmwiththeoptionofendingprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Aperformanceevaluationconductedattheinterimstagesortsemployeesintotwogroups:stayorquit.Itisefficienttoquitiftheearlyreturnsareweak,andtostayotherwise.Iftheagent’searlyoutputislow,itisintheinterestofboththefirmandtheagenttodiscontinueworkandcollecttheirrespectiveoutsideoptions.Inthissense,theperformanceevaluationassignsanagenttohismostefficientuse.Theroleoftheevaluation,therefore,istoperformthissorting.Interimperformanceevaluationschangetheefficientallocationofre-sourcesovertimeinsurprisingways.Themainresultshowsthatitisefficienttoassignmoreresourcestothelaterstagesoftheproject.Theevaluationcreatesthepossibilityofterminationaftertheearlystage,whichreducesthemarginalreturnfromfirst-stageeffort,andsotheagentshadeshiseffortdownwardintheearlystage.Oncetheagentadvances,thepossibilityofterminationvanishesandthemarginalreturntoeffortrises,soheworksharder.Insum,itisefficienttostayiftheearlyreturnsarehigh,andforthosethatstay,itisefficienttoworkharder.ounting,economics,andfinance(seeBaiman[1982,1990],Indjejikian[1999],Lambert[2001],Prendergast[1999]forreviews).Agencytheoryhasenjoyedwidetheoreticalattentionoverthelast20years,andhasdramaticallyadvancedourunderstandingofperformancemeasurement.Unfortunately,itsempiricalsupportremainsmixed,asPrendergast[2002]andLazear[2003]document.Theresultsofmostagencymodelsarehighlysensitivetotheirdetails—theinformationstructure,thetimingofthegame,therestrictionsonthecontracts,etc.Sowhenthedetailsofthegamechange,evenslightly,sodothepredictionsofthemodel.Thispapertakesadifferentapproach.Thefocushereisnotonincentives,butonsorting.plexcontractinggamewithinthefirm.Theaimistounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationtoallparties,nottheopportunisticuseofinformationbyoneside.Theanalysishereshiftsattention 内容来自淘豆网www.taodocs.com转载请标明出处.
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