外文翻译 原文 Non-Tradable Share Reform and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock Market Material Source: Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(4): 457–475 Author:Yin-Hua Ye, Pei-Gi Shu, Yu-Hui Su 1. Abstract Research Question/Issue: Prior to China’s split-share structure reform, domestic shares were divided into non-tradable and tradable shares. Non-tradable shareholders represent the government, hold roughly a two-thirds majority, and manage the firms, while tradable shareholders have little power to affect the decisions made by non-tradable shareholders. This is a typical structure to exhibit agency problems. The 2005 structure reform program stipulates that non-tradable shareholders have to bargain with tradable shareholders in order to gain liquidity. The price that non-tradable shareholders pay to tradable shareholders for gaining liquidity is defined as “compensation ”.We explore the issue of why corporate governance might play an important role in affecting the level pensation. Research Findings/Insights: Firms with a weak governance structure or severe agency problems are required to have a higher level pensation. The level pensation is positively correlated with the non-tradable shareholding, the pledge ratio, and related-party transactions, and is negatively correlated with foreign shareholdings. The same set of variables dictates the ex-post w