下载此文档

电力工程监理过程博弈分析.docx


文档分类:办公文档 | 页数:约3页 举报非法文档有奖
1/ 3
下载提示
  • 1.该资料是网友上传的,本站提供全文预览,预览什么样,下载就什么样。
  • 2.下载该文档所得收入归上传者、原创者。
  • 3.下载的文档,不会出现我们的网址水印。
1/ 3 下载此文档
文档列表 文档介绍
该【电力工程监理过程博弈分析 】是由【niuww】上传分享,文档一共【3】页,该文档可以免费在线阅读,需要了解更多关于【电力工程监理过程博弈分析 】的内容,可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能,选择自己适合的文档,以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字,如需要获得完整电子版,请下载此文档到您的设备,方便您编辑和打印。电力工程监理过程博弈分析
Abstract
The game theory is a widely used tool in analyzing the optimization of complex systems. In this paper, we analyze the process of power engineering supervision using game theory. The game is played between the owner, the contractor, and the supervisor with each player having their own objectives. We explain the objectives and constraints of each player and analyze how they align or conflict with those of the other players. We first determine the game type, then analyze the strategies each player uses to achieve their objectives, and finally, we propose some solutions to optimize the game outcome.
Introduction
Power engineering supervision is a crucial aspect that ensures the successful completion of a power engineering project. The supervisory process involves monitoring and evaluating the engineering design, the construction procurement, and the construction process of the project. The supervision ensures that the project is implemented according to the set standards, codes and specifications, and that it complies with the project scope. The supervision process involves various players, including the owner, contractor, and supervisor, each with their own objectives. In this paper, we analyze the power engineering supervision process using game theory and provide insights on the optimal strategies each player should use to achieve their objective.
Game type determination
Game theory is a tool that we use to analyze complex systems. The first step in analyzing the game is to determine the game type. Power engineering supervision can be modeled as a sequential game with a Stackelberg equilibrium. In this game, the owner is the leader, and the contractor is the follower. The supervisor is the regulator, monitoring the behavior of both the owner and the contractor.
Players and their objectives
The power engineering supervision game involves three players, the owner, the contractor, and the supervisor, each with their own objectives. The owner's objective is to complete the project on time, within budget, and according to the required quality standards. The contractor's objective is to maximize its profit while meeting the owner's requirements. The supervisor's objective is to ensure that the project meets the set standards, codes, and specifications while minimizing supervision cost.
Strategies
The players in the power engineering supervision game use various strategies to achieve their objectives. The contractor uses a mix of strategies that include increasing the project's scope, quality, and resources to maximize profits. The owner's strategy involves making sure that the contractor completes the project within the agreed timelines and budget while maintaining the required quality standards. The supervisor's strategy includes reducing inspection times and minimizing costs while ensuring the project complies with the set standards and specifications.
Game analysis
Using game theory, we analyze the strategies used by each player and the possible outcomes. We first analyze the decision-making process of the contractor. The contractor's profit function is subject to three factors; project scope, quality, and resources. The contractor's primary aim is to increase the project scope and resources while maintaining the required quality standards. There is a conflict of interest between the owner and the contractor because the owner aims to minimize the project's costs, and the contractor seeks to maximize profits. The contractor may increase the project's scope and resources, resulting in a higher profit margin but increasing the project's overall cost.
The owner's strategy involves minimizing costs, and thus it may set lower expectations for the project's scope and quality. This strategy aims to discourage the contractor from increasing the project's cost. The owner may also opt for a fixed-price contract that reduces the contractor's incentive to increase the project's cost. A fixed-price contract ensures the contractor delivers the project according to the set requirements, regardless of the cost.
The supervisor's strategy aims to minimize the overall supervision cost while ensuring the project complies with the set standards. The supervisor may adopt an inspection protocol that reduces the inspection time and cost while ensuring the project meets the set standards, codes, and specifications.
Game outcome optimization solutions
To optimize the power engineering supervision game outcome, we propose three solutions. The first solution is to develop a robust inspection plan. The inspection plan should be efficient in terms of cost and time, and ensure the project complies with the set standards and specifications.
The second solution is to improve communication and coordination between the owner, contractor, and supervisor. Cooperation between the players ensures that the project scope, quality, and cost objectives are well-aligned.
The third solution is to use a performance-based contract with incentives for the contractor to encourage compliance with the project's set objectives. The contract rewards the contractor for meeting the set standards, meeting the project's scope and quality requirements, and completing the work on time. This contract ensures the contractor is motivated to achieve the project's set objectives.
Conclusion
The power engineering supervision process is a complex process that involves numerous players. Each player has their own objectives, constraints, and strategies. Game theory is an analytical tool that can be used to analyze the power engineering supervision process. In this paper, we have analyzed the power engineering supervision game using game theory and discussed the strategies used by each player. We have proposed solutions that optimize the game outcome, including improving cooperation, developing a robust inspection plan, and implementing a performance-based contract. Proper implementation of these solutions can ensure a successful power engineering supervision process that meets the set standards, specifications and delivers the expected outcomes.

电力工程监理过程博弈分析 来自淘豆网www.taodocs.com转载请标明出处.

相关文档 更多>>
非法内容举报中心
文档信息
  • 页数 3
  • 收藏数 0 收藏
  • 顶次数 0
  • 上传人 niuww
  • 文件大小 11 KB
  • 时间2025-04-23