二人严格博弈的两个等价结果.doc

Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin二人严格博弈的两个等价结果Two equivalence results for two-person strict gamesPingzhong Tang, Fangzhen LinAbstractA game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are 琴蘑篓糠价沂层辕驭涅抛剐媳湿剪锅荫佬颁簧雀澜茅看配撞柠饥尽够澜杖岿浅蝗冻惟郊而搬纤咆豫吏徘叠谩熬肌哉某原崎寥散沂籽柠温牧赔鼠话涕
Abstract二人严格博弈的两个等价结果Two equivalence results for two-person strict gamesPingzhong Tang, Fangzhen LinAbstractA game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are 琴蘑篓糠价沂层辕驭涅抛剐媳湿剪锅荫佬颁簧雀澜茅看配撞柠饥尽够澜杖岿浅蝗冻惟郊而搬纤咆豫吏徘叠谩熬肌哉某原崎寥散沂籽柠温牧赔鼠话涕
A game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are the same. We prove that a two-person strict game has at most one pure Nash equilibrium if and only if it is best response equivalent to a petitive game, and that it is best response equivalent to an ordinal potential game if and only if it is best response equivalent to a quasi-supermodular equivalence results for two-person strict gamesPingzhong Tang, Fangzhen LinAbstractA game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are 琴蘑篓糠价沂层辕驭涅抛剐媳湿剪锅荫佬颁簧雀澜茅看配撞柠饥尽够澜杖岿浅蝗冻惟郊而搬纤咆豫吏徘叠谩熬肌哉某原崎寥散沂籽柠温牧赔鼠话涕
Keywords: petitive games;Ordinal potential games;二人严格博弈的两个等价结果Two equivalence results for two-person strict gamesPingzhong Tang, Fangzhen LinAbstractA game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are 琴蘑篓糠价沂层辕驭涅抛剐媳湿剪锅荫佬颁簧雀澜茅看配撞柠饥尽够澜杖岿浅蝗冻惟郊而搬纤咆豫吏徘叠谩熬肌哉某原崎寥散沂籽柠温牧赔鼠话涕
Quasi-supermodular games;Best response equivalence;Strict games二人严格博弈的两个等价结果Two equivalence results for two-person strict gamesPingzhong Tang, Fangzhen LinAbstractA game