methodology of cyber security assessment in the smart grid 2017 pil sung woo资料.pdf

该【methodology of cyber security assessment in the smart grid 2017 pil sung woo资料 】是由【四婆子】上传分享，文档一共【7】页，该文档可以免费在线阅读，需要了解更多关于【methodology of cyber security assessment in the smart grid 2017 pil sung woo资料 】的内容，可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能，选择自己适合的文档，以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字，如需要获得完整电子版，请下载此文档到您的设备，方便您编辑和打印。;12(2):495-501ISSN(Print)1975-0102https:///.(Online)2093-7423MethodologyofCyberSecurityAssessmentintheSmartGridPilSungWoo*?Abstract–Theintroductionofsmartgrid,whichisaninnovativeapplicationofdigitalprocessingmunicationstothepowergrid,,TheEnergyManagementSystem(EMS)worksinteractwiththepowersystemonarealtimebasis,,theoptimalpowerflow(OPF),thephysicalandeconomicimpactsfrompotentialcyberthreatsareassessed,:Smartgrid,Cyberthreat,Informationsecurity,Energymanagementsystem,Optimalpowerflow,Powerflowtracing,Analytichierarchyprocess,,,SouthKoreahasenvisionedbuildingaSmartGrid,ordingtoSANSinstitute1definition,,-timecharacteristicaswellasahighlevelofVulnerabilityisdefinedasasecurityhole,andtheavailability(lowfaultfrequencyandrapidrecovery).,threatsrefertocyber-attacks,andassetsareurdueto(IT)-,,vulnerabilityisasecurityhole,-municationaspolicystudiestoapplyexistinginformationtechnology(IT)systemsecuritypoliciestothesmartgridfield[1-3].Inthispaper,issuesofsmartgridsecuritywherephysicalcharacteristicsofpowersystemsweretakenintoconsiderationaredefinedclearly,andastrategicmethodologywasestablishedthatcanproduceacyber-riskindexinthesmartgridusingoptimalpowerflow(OPF),?CorrespondingAuthor:,HongikUniversity,Seoul,Korea.(******@)1TheSANSInstitute(OfficiallytheEscalInstituteofAdvances*ElectricalSafetyResearchInstitute,KoreaElectricSafetyCO.,Technologies)-panyfoundedin1989Korea.(******@):June30,2016;Accepted:October25,2016(/)495Copyright?TheKoreanInstituteofElectricalEngineersThisisanOpen-mercialLicense(/licenses/by-nc//)mercialuse,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium,,,vulnerability,toanasset[4].TheshadedpartinTable1referstorealrisksthatexistBasedontheabovedefinition,ponentsandthreats,whilethenon-shownin(1)whereT,V,A,andRarethreat,vulnerability,ponentsasset,andrisk,respectively.××,thefollowingfourassumptionsR=TVA(1),=1waspresentedbasedon(1).First,=,=50%Vulnerability=∑
×
systems,optimalpowerflowandpowerflowtracing,
whicharecoretechnologiesinpowersystemoperation,=reC,ponentintheEMST
=,aquantitativevariousquantificationmethodsforinformationsystemvalueofvulnerabilitycanbeestablishedasfollows:,similartomanyadvancedresearches,[5-8].,apartoftheanalytichierarchyprocess(AHP),whichisaquantificationassessmentmethodthatInTable2,thehigherthevulnerabilityvalue,theeasierconsidersmultipleattributes,[9,10].(V)Toquantifyvulnerability,15typesofcyberthreatswereThequantitativevaluesofthreatsarebasedonTable1inponentsinpowerwhichvulnerabilitywasanalyzedandthreatquantificationsystemsandindividualthreatswasdefinedasshowninTable1[2].(horizontalaxis).InfraEMSSCADARTUNormali-TCP/(5)(4)(1)zationThreats(3)(2)....(Backdoor)Trapdoor(Backdoor)&IllegitimateUse00001Theft&(36)│;12(2):495-(horizontalaxis)andthreats(verticalTable4showsthenormalizedresultsofriskperthreataxis).ordingtotype(verticalaxis).potentialdamagesizeandthesizesofthreatarenormalizedTofinallyquantifythreats,-urs,-shadedpartbasedonTable1=(EMS=5,=4,TCP/IP=3,Serial=2,RTU=1)=1(Normalization),thesmartgridassetisdefinedastheApplyingtheabovethreepre-conditions,municationequipment,suchasEMS,SCADA,municationinfrastructure(TCP/IP,Serial),andRTUThefollowingpre-,-shadedpartbasedonTable1=0ofassets.

=
(
)+
(
)
≈
(
)(2)
(Confidentiality,Integrity,andAvailability(CIA))of
informationsecurityandmixedelements
(Availability(4)>Integrity(3)>Mixed(2)>P∶Power[MW]Confidentiality(1))wkhe∶=1(Normalization)
∶ponentsinEMS[KRW]
∶municaitonequipment[KRW](verticalaxis)OC∶Outagecost[KRW].InfraRTUEMSSCADAThreatsTCP/IPSerialEavesdroppingEq.(2)(1)(1)equipment;hence,thetotalcostcanbeapproximatedtotheConfidentEM/(1)(1).(1)(2)((Backdoor)(2)EM/+)Spoofing(2)(3)(3)Trapdoor(Backdoor)(3)(3)(3)&(3)Theft&(4)│:ActivepowerflowingfromBusitoBusjQFij::PhaseangleofBusiVi:(OPF)Formulationfim:GenerationcostfunctionofGeneratorminBusiIngeneral,theOPFconceptreferstotheeconomicdispatchplanundertechnical,physical,andenvironmentalEq.(3),whichisanobjectivefunction,referstotheconstraints[11].Thatis,,(4)(5)areactiveandreactivepowerbalanceconstraints,.(6)and(7)areactiveandreactivepowerfollows:flowconstraints,.(8)and(9)refertoactiveandreactiveconstraints,respectively,withrespecttoObjecMtiivneimFuiznectFio=n
(3).(10)and(11)refertoactive
andreactiveconstraints,respectively,withrespecttopower
∈
∈
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,(12)isaconstraintwithrespectto
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voltagesize.

rain
ts
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,?i∈I(4)correlationbetweenanindividualgeneratorandloadbased
onpowerflowconnectedbetweengrossgenerationand
∈
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,damageowingtoserviceinterruption
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,?i∈I(5)causedbydisturbancecanbeestimatedbyidentifying
amountsofpowersupplytospecificloadsbyindividual
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generators.
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(6)
powerflowtracingmethoddevisedin[12]wasusedinthis
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study;thispowerflowtracingmethodisbasedon
+(
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/2
),?
(7)
Kirchhoff'scurrentlaw(KCL)andgraphtheoryandis
≤
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(8)suitabletoresolveissuesrelatedtosystemtopologyand
≤
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(9)hasanadvantageoffastcalculation.
≤P
≤
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(10)
≤Q
≤
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(11)
≤
≤
,?
i∈I
(12)
Thesimulationpowersysteminthisstudyisa13-bussystem:(mercial,andwhere,industrialregions):SetofbusMi:SetofgeneratorsinBusii,j::::ActivepowerinjectioninBusiQLi:ReactivepowerinjectioninBusiGl:ConductanceinLinelBl:SusceptanceinLinelBcap:ParallelcapacitanceinLinelTPl:CapacityofactivepowertransmissionlineinLinelTQl:CapacityofreactivepowertransmissionlineinLinelPGim:-BuspowersystemQGim:ReactivepowerfromBusitoGeneratorm498