公司治理和控股股东掏空.pdf

硕士学位论文AbstractInChina,pany,theconflictsbetweencontrollingstock—holdersandminoritystock—,theboardofdirectorsandtheboardofsupervisorssubjecttothecontrollingstock-—,-holdersandmanagerstotheconflictsbetweenstock—(1999)saidexceptminoritycountriessuchasBritainandUS气inmostcountries,panyisnotprohibitmanagerfrombuildinghisownempire,butlimitingthecontrollingstock-holdertodepriveoftheminoritystock-,informationeconomicsandempiricalapproach,,thepaperfirstlyproposesthecorporategovernanceframeworkwhichimpactsthetunnelingbehaviorofcontrollingshareholder,,wedeeplyanalyzethetunnelingfromthreeaspectsofcorporategovernance,whichincludebigshareholdergovernanceandtheboardgovernance,thedesignofincentivecontract,andtheexternalgovernanceincludingthelegalprotectionofinvestors,panycontrolofthemarket,,paniesbetween2003and2006,:(1)the”onlyonebigshare”ownershipstructurehassignificantlystrengthenedthecontrollingshareholder’StunnelingBehavior,however,theeffectofpowerbalancewithshareholderstructurewasnotobvious.(2)TheeffectoftheⅢboardgovernanceislimited,,an