经营者激励约束机制和国有企业改革.docx

摘要现代企业制度的基本特征之一就是所有权与经营权分离问题目前国有企业改革的方向是建立代企业制度按照从而产生了委托代理产权清晰责权分明政企分开科学管理的原则将国有企业改造成为规范的公司制企业在国有企业委托代理过程中由于信息不对称以及所有者和经营者目标的不一致产生委托代理成本存在着经营者的道德风险和内部人控制等问题一般认为降低委托代理成本的基本途径有两条一是约束二是激励本文利用经济学和管理学的理论在前人大量研究的基础上借鉴和吸收西方现代公司委托代理理论的先进思想针对我国国有企业的特点和国情对国有企业的治理结构和激励约束机制进行了深入细致的探讨并在对我国国有企业经营者激励约束机制现状及国有企业本质分析的基础上提出了国企分类改革的思路循此思路对国企经营者激励约束机制设计问题进行了探讨完善国有企业法人治理结构建立企业经营者的激励约束机制是我国国有企业改革的核心问题本文对经营者激励机制中的报酬激励精神激励和职位消费激励分别进行了探讨针对国有企业的特点提出了以企业内部监控机制和和外部监控机制相结合的综合治理结构模式主要阐明了在明确国有企业的分类及目标的前提下选择合理的业绩考核指标坚持物质激励与精神激励的有机结合采取有效的措施以保证国有企业经营者激励约束目标的实现关键词委托代理经营者激励机制约束机制国有企业改革-I Abstract One of the basic features of the modern enterprise system is the separation of ownership and operation, which gives birth to the problem of principle and agent At present, the reform of state owned enterprises (SOEs) aims to establish modern enterprise system and to rebuild SOEs into standardized corporations according to the principle of“ explicitness of property right definitude of obligation and right and scientific management ” Because of informational asymmetry and discrepancy of goal of executives and that of enterprises, the cost of principal-es into being and the problem of“ moral hazard ” and insider control generally exist It is generally thought that incentive and discipline are the two basic ways used to reduce the cost of principal-agent In this paper, based upon the research results of precedents, it borrows and absorbs the advanced the theories of modern principal-agent system of the western countries. At the same time ,according to Characteristic of China ’s enterprises and situation of China the theories of economics and management are used to make deep and detailed research of the governance structure and incentive and disciplinary mechanism of executives And on base of analyzing status quo of incentive and disciplinary mechanism in SOEs and essences of SOEs, classified SOEs reform is discussed In this way, the problem that designs incentive and disciplinary mechanism in SOEs is discussed. I