Parietal cortex and representation of the mental Self
Hans C. Lou*†‡, Bruce Luber*, Michael Crupain*, Julian P. Keenan§, Markus Nowak†, Troels W. Kjaer†,
Harold A. Sackeim*, and Sarah H. Lisanby*
*ic Brain Stimulation Laboratory, Department of Biological Psychiatry, New York State Psychiatric Institute, and Department of Psychiatry, Columbia
College of Physicians and Surgeons, 1051 Riverside Drive, Unit 126, New York, NY 10032; †Cyclotron and Positron Emission Tomography Center,
Rigshospitalet and Department of Clinical Physiology, Bispebjerg Hospital, Copenhagen University Hospital, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark; and §Cognitive
Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, 219 Dickson, Upper Montclair, NJ 07043
Edited by Michael I. Posner, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, and approved March 11, 2004 (received for review January 8, 2004)
For a coherent and meaningful life, conscious self-representation is a simple non-memory-loaded condition with identical input and
mandatory. Such explicit ‘‘autonoetic consciousness’’ is thought to output as a control.
emerge by retrieval of memory of personally experienced events Finally, not only may episodic memory retrieval and, hence,
(‘‘episodic memory’’). During episodic retrieval, functional imaging autonoetic consciousness be panied by activation in the
studies consistently show differential
PARIETAL CORTEX AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MENTAL SELF 来自淘豆网www.taodocs.com转载请标明出处.