【哈佛法律评论】volume123.pdf

VOLUME 123 JANUARY 2010 NUMBER 3
© 2010 by The Harvard Law Review Association

ARTICLES
COMPLEMENTARY CONSTRAINTS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS, RATIONAL VOTING,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Jide O. Nzelibe and Matthew C. Stephenson
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: AN OVERVIEW .................................................................................. 624
II. HOW SEPARATION OF POWERS AFFECTS
RATIONAL RETROSPECTIVE VOTING ............................................................................. 627
A. The Baseline Case: A Single Elected Agent................................................................... 627
B. The Impact of Separation of Powers on Electoral Strategies
and Political Behavior ..................................................................................................... 631
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 636
A. Presidential Empire Building ......................................................................................... 637
B. Responsibility Shifting ..................................................................................................... 639
C. Gridlock .............................................................................................................................. 643
D. Voter Welfare ...................................................................................................................... 645
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................